









When the failed 2012 Presidential candidate Mitt Romney called 47% of the US population “dependent,” the remark was widely perceived as an insult significant enough to negatively influence the outcome of his Presidential bid.  Yet if we step back, we well might ask why humans, who belong to a thoroughly social species, so despise dependence. Dependence on others allows for needed care, knowledge, culture, technology, and political, social and economic goods—the sine qua non of human life in any era.  A reliance on government services counts as a primary advantage of a modern, relatively well-ordered state.  We might as well decry our dependence on air.  There are historical, ideological, and structural reasons why we so often refuse to acknowledge our dependence. (MacIntyre 1997)  This refusal is evident with respect to disability.
Writers such as Michael Oliver have maintained that dependency itself is central to the fact that disability is experienced “as a particular kind of social problem” (Oliver 1989, 8).  As such it has shaped the social life of people with disabilities (Barton 1989)  Against this position, other disability scholars have insisted that what undermines the ability of disabled people to flourish is the view that being self-sufficient, self-reliant, and self-determining is the norm, and the only desirable state of persons in a liberal society,   On this view an acknowledgment of our dependency makes possible the reshaping our understanding and experience of both ability and disability (Shakespeare 2006, Kittay 2003, 1999, Weicht 2010).
Contemporary philosopher, Nancy Fraser, and historian, Linda Gordon, traced a “genealogy of dependence”, claiming that independence was once a status reserved for elites who could command the services of others (Fraser and Gordon 310), and only later became a status assumed by the many. With the emergence of wage labor, the spread of political enfranchisement, and the lessened importance of status-based birth, independence came with the ability to earn a living sufficient to support oneself and one’s family. Women were precluded from economic independence by laws and conventions; paupers by their inability to become waged laborers; colonials by political constraints.  More recently, those who are excluded from independent status are thought to have a moral or psychological flaw. Welfare dependence bespeaks laziness or deficient internalized cultural values; emotional dependence displays weakness; chemical dependence shows the lack of will power.   
Fraser and Gordon trace the genealogy of “dependency” as a keyword in the U. S. welfare state to reveal that the association of dependence of government support with a characterological flaw emerges in a particular historical moment.  Interestingly, disability as a source of dependency does not figure in this account.  In identifying four registers of dependency—economic, political, sociolegal and characterological— Fraser and Gordon overlook situations in which obtaining the necessities for life is tied to inevitable biologically-based limitations.  It is a fact that humans all have a period of extended dependency at the beginning of life, and during recurrent periods, such as when they are injured or ill or too frail to fend for themselves.  Thus, a fifth register is the inevitable human dependence register.  Some inevitability we do dread, such as death. Most inevitable conditions we accept and meet with resilience.  The need for food is inevitable but we accept it as a condition of our lives. This inevitable need becomes the site of cultural identity, family warmth, artistic creation and sociality.  As an inevitable fact of human existence shared in reality or in potentiality by all, the fact of human dependence may not always be palatable, but neither must it always be undesirable.  Yet we find a moral or psychological stigma attached to inevitable dependence, just as it does to other forms of dependence.
Nonetheless no decent society fails to take some responsibility to meet (even if inadequately), needs of those who find themselves inevitably dependent.  And just as inevitably, in each society there are others who must tend to these needs.  These dependency workers may be family or paid caregivers or attendants.  They may be personally provided or state-supplied.  As their efforts and attention are used in the service of another’s needs and wants, especially when they are unpaid family members, they are less able to attend their own needs and to act as independent agents, becoming derivatively dependent (Fineman 1995, Kittay 1999). We see then that the concept of inevitable human dimension – the fifth register -- reveals two important aspects of “dependency” which are otherwise missed: dependency is not always socially constructed, and dependency workers become derivatively dependent. 
Meeting human needs is sufficiently complex that we need a division of labor that issue in dependencies and interdependencies.  Some prefer to speak of interdependence rather than dependence (Arneil 2009, Fine and Glendinning 2005). However we cannot acknowledge our interdependency without first recognizing our dependency.  Moreover in some ways we are simply dependent and unable to respond to the others needs.  And that dependence too is part of a normal human life lived intertwined with others.  
This paradigm of the fifth register is the child, and many mistakenly assume that the paradigm applies to all who occupy this register..  Thus, not uncommonly the inevitably dependent are treated as children: incompetent, asexual, “cute”, “entering a second childhood”.  They are then presumed to be proper objects of paternalistic concern.  But children are not alone in their inability to fend for themselves, and adults who share a level of dependence are rightfully offended by such infantilization.  In our modern industrial and post-industrial world, where independence is construed as the mark of adulthood, it is difficult for many to acknowledge that dependence is recurrent and that we are universally vulnerable to it.  Hence we cloak it in invisibility, or stigmatize it with hypervisibility. The independence of the “hale and hearty” worker comes at a cost. The underside of a society that places supreme value on the fully functioning, independent adult worker, is the stigmatized and infantilized disabled individual. Disabled people have rejected the notion of dependence as inherent in disability, preferring instead to redefine independence as including “the vast networks of assistance and provision that make modern life possible” (Davis 2007, 4). Then as literary and disability scholar, Lennard Davis, says “the seeming state of exception of disability turns out to be the unexceptional state of existence “(Davis 2007, 4) 
The refusal to be labeled dependent is based first on the refusal to be infantilized objects of paternalistic concern, and second, on the supposition that the source of dependence is internal to the individual. In demanding the means by which to become independent, disability scholars and activists countered the narrative of the inevitability of dependence for disabled people with a counternarrative (Hilde 2001).  People with impairments were made dependent, just as they were disabled, by a social environment not accommodated to their bodies.  With the appropriate accommodations and personal assistants who would be under their direction, disabled people could live independently.  Judy Heumann, an early American champion of “independent living” promotes it as “a mind process not contingent upon a normal body” (Heumann 1977).
The counternarrative depends on a shift from an understanding of independence as self-sufficiency to one of independence as self-determination (Young 2002, 45). This tactic spurred the “Independent Living Movement” (ILM) and, in the US, it culminated with the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990; 2008) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (2004). The Independent Living Movement was founded in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s  in the US and then spread to other nations.  The early founders were relatively young and physically disabled.  Their demands were largely tailored to this population (De Jong 1983).  They called for accessibility in transportation, living arrangements, education, employment and inclusion in social and familial life to allow them control over their circumstances comparable to those without physical disabilities. Sorting out the different senses of independence promoted by ILM is not always easy, even to the disabled individual himself.   As medical sociologist and disability rights activist Irving Zola writes: 
The important thing was that I got there under my own steam, physically independent and mainstreamed. But the price I paid was a high one…I, for far too long, contributed to the demise of my own social and psychological independence (Zola 1988, 14-15).
The independence to which he aspired was, he discovered, “the quality of life that [he]… could live with help.”  (De Jong 1983, cited in Zola 1988, 15)
Whatever the precise valence of “independence” promoted in these first-wave expressions of disability rights activism and memoir, such aspiration led to a frequent analogy with other civil rights movements.  In those struggles, the privileged gain material advantage by the oppression of the other.  In a similar vein, the British Council of Disabled which identified itself as “the UK's national organisation of the worldwide Disabled People's Movement,” (BCODP) wrote: 
[H]owever good passivity and the creation of dependency may be for the careers of service providers, it is bad news for disabled people and the public purse. It is a viewpoint which meets with strong resistance in our organization (BCODP 1987, sect. 3.1, 5).
While the call for independence has promoted the interests and improved the life prospects of people with physical disabilities, and while it has successfully been expanded to include some with other disabilities, there are important limitations.
First, the applicability of “independent living” may be limited.  While the BCODP derides the idea that disabled people need to be “looked after,” some people with disabilities and frailties do indeed require looking after.  Surely we should give all people as much self-determination and control over their lives as possible.  But some impairments affect the capacity for self-determination, just as some impairments affect mobility or sensory perception. 
A second problem with arguments for independence is that they are often tied to the idea that allowing disabled people to be independent ultimately saves public expenditures because the provisions sought are less costly and disabled people can become productive members of society, thus repaying the costs of the needed services and contributing materially to society.  While these strategic utilitarian arguments counter the image of disabled people as “burdens” on society, they feed the sentiment that the public should not have to be responsible for “dependents” who cannot pay their own way.  Not only does this view disadvantage those least able to fend for themselves, shifting the cost and care to struggling families, but it also is liable to hurt those whose ability to be self-determining requires increased, not reduced expenditures.  Relatedly, arguments that bind independence to productivity are useful insofar as most people desire meaningful work.  But for some, no amount of accommodation can make this possible.  Where the expectation for work is imposed on those for whom it is impossible, meaningless tasks take the place of more fulfilling activity.  It is an especially punishing view for those whose capacities for productive labor diminish with age. (Morris 2004, 2011)
	And finally, the demand for independence for disabled people relies heavily on the availability and compliance of caregivers. But there is a danger in the claim that “independence” is achieved by engaging personal assistants.  To what extent does the supposition that the disabled person is “independent” render the assistant invisible and effectively subordinate his (or more often her) status and interests to the disabled person she serves? (Rivas 2002).
A consideration of dependency forces the question: can one still protect the benefits to be gained by disabled people’s demands for independence without re-stigmatizing those who do not benefit?  Can we accept the inevitability of dependence without denying the negative effects of an imposed dependency on the lives of many disabled people?  And can we accept reliance on dependency workers without subordinating their interests to those of the disabled person? 
Social organization is at least in part a response to inevitable human dependency.  Rather than joining the able on a quixotic quest for a nonexistent independence, we might take the occasion of disability to find a better way to manage dependency.   We can be relatively independent, but even this independence will be at someone’s expense if we do not  weave dependency needs into the fabric of society.  Yet the fact remains that depending on another, (or even on a piece of equipment) can leave one frustrated, angry, and feeling helpless. Dependency, aside from its stigma and from the assault on one’s sense of self-worth can be experienced adversely by disabled and nondisabled alike. 
	In a particularly insightful article on managing dependency in frail old age, renowned psychologist and gerontologist Margret Baltes, (1995) distinguishes learned helplessness from what she calls “learned dependency” in the context of supported living environments.  People develop “learned helplessness” when their attempts to affect their environment do not produce predictable outcomes.  They become passive and stop trying to be efficacious. Learned dependency, in contrast, results in circumstances an individual’s dependent behaviors initiate social contact, but the person’s independent behavior elicits little response from others. In such environments, striving for “independence” is less rewarding than what Baltes refers to as effective “management of dependency.” Some of the elderly in her study allowed themselves to receive assistance in areas where, they could meet their own needs, but with great effort.  They chose instead to reserve energy for areas of life that provided more satisfaction. Rather than battling the loss of capacities when the exercise of these interfered with more important activities, these elderly were capable of richer and more efficacious lives.. They displayed what philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre called “the virtue of acknowledged dependency”. That is to say, they gave dependency its due. This is reminiscent of the strategy Zola adopted and which he chose to call “independence.”  But we avoid buying into the myth of independence when we think of it instead as “managed dependence.”
If we manage dependence, we acknowledge its presence in our lives, select and optimize the opportunities that such acknowledgment makes possible, and can better detect and protect against the fault lines that are part and parcel of our condition as dependent beings.  In its name we can demand a reordering of priorities and an assertion of entitlements that are our due, not because we can be independent and productive, but because our value derives from the chain of dependent relations that make all our lives possible. Bringing this understanding into the lifeblood of society can be a precious contribution from the community of disabled people. .  
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